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Abstract 
 
Introduction 
Inequalities in infant mortality rates (IMR) are rising in some Low and Middle-
Income Countries (LMICs) and falling in others, but the explanation for these 
divergent trends is unclear. We investigate whether government expenditures 
and redistribution are associated with reductions in inequalities in IMR. 
 
Methods 
We estimated country-level fixed-effects panel regressions for 48 LMICs (142 
country-observations). Slope and Relative Indices of Inequality in IMR (SII and 
RII) were calculated from Demographic and Health Surveys between 1993-2013. 
RII and SII were regressed on government expenditure (total, health, and non-
health) and redistribution, controlling for GDP, private health expenditures, a 
democracy indicator, country fixed effects, and time. 
 
Results 
Mean SII and RII was 39.12 and 0.69. In multivariate models, a one percentage-
point increase in total government expenditure (% of GDP) was associated with 
a decrease in SII of -2.468 (95% CIs: -4.190, -0.746) and RII of -0.026 (95% CIs: -
0.048, -0.004). Lower inequalities were associated with higher non-health 
government expenditure, but not higher government health expenditure. 
Associations with inequalities were nonsignificant for GDP, government 
redistribution, and private health expenditure. 
 
Discussion 
Understanding how non-health government expenditure reduces inequalities in 
IMR, and why health expenditures may not, will accelerate progress towards the 
Sustainable Development Goals.  
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Introduction   
Global child mortality (deaths under the age of five years) has fallen by a 
remarkable 53% since 1990, and has fallen in nearly all low and middle income 
countries (LMICs) (You et al., 2015). However, inequalities in child mortality 
rates within countries remain high. If these inequalities could be reduced and 
average child mortality rates in each country were reduced to the rate seen 
among the wealthiest 10% in that country, then it is estimated that 2.9 million 
child deaths would be averted (Amouzou et al., 2014). Child mortality rates 
amongst the richest quintile in some LMICs can even be lower than the rates for 
the poorest quintile in some High Income Countries (HICs), justifying an even 
greater focus on within-country inequalities. Therefore, the Countdown to 2015 
Report and the UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation have 
highlighted inequalities in child mortality as a key priority for the Sustainable 
Development Goal era (Victora et al., 2016; You et al., 2015).  
 
This study focuses on social inequalities in Infant Mortality Rates (IMR – deaths 
in the first year per 1000 live births). Infant mortality is responsible for 45% of 
all child deaths worldwide (Liu et al., 2016), and the IMR remains high in many 
countries, predominantly due to death during the neonatal period (the first 28 
days of life). IMR is a valuable indicator for assessing the short-term impact of 
changes in the social determinants of health because of the social origins of the 
main causes of infant death (Conley and Springer, 2001; Sartorius and Sartorius, 
2014). Mortality during infancy stems from two main causes. Firstly, it is caused 
by complications before, during, or just after pregnancy, which respond to basic 
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antenatal, obstetric, and neonatal health care services. Secondly, infant mortality 
is caused by infectious diseases, primarily pneumonia, diarrhoeal diseases, and 
malaria. These are strongly determined by intermediate social factors such as 
malnutrition, access to water and sanitation infrastructure, fertility rates, and 
education levels.  
 
It is only recently that repeated Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have 
made it possible to study inequalities in IMR in LMICs (Houweling and Kunst, 
2010). Studies have since identified divergent trends in inequalities in IMR that 
varied by country. For example Wagstaff et al. (2014) found that, between 1990 
and 2011, approximately half of the 41 countries surveyed by the DHS program 
had falling inequalities in IMR over time, whilst half had increasing inequalities.  
 
Houweling and Kunst, based on the seminal work of Mosley and Chen, argue that 
variations in inequalities in IMR are driven by inequalities in the intermediate 
causes of IMR (for example, access to water and sanitation), which are in turn 
driven by structural inequalities in society - particularly income and wealth 
inequalities (Houweling and Kunst, 2010; Mosley and Chen, 1984). Based on their 
work, three theoretical policy levers can be proposed that governments could use 
to influence inequalities in IMR: redistribution to reduce the underlying income 
and wealth inequalities, non-health government expenditure to reduce 
inequalities in the intermediate causes, and health expenditure to reduce 
inequalities in health care utilisation (see Figure 1: Conceptual Framework). 
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Few studies have attempted to empirically explain why some countries have high 
inequalities and some have low inequalities in IMR. Most have focused on child 
mortality rather than infant mortality. The earliest studies focused on 
longitudinal studies in individual countries (see review by Houweling and Kunst, 
2010). There are difficulties arising from these studies as the results are often not 
generalisable beyond the country of study, and spurious results may be identified 
due to confounding with time trends (Sogaard, 1992; Wagstaff, 1985). For 
example, any association found between health care expenditure and changes in 
health inequalities may in fact be due to long term secular trends, such as 
economic growth or expanding access to education, which are often overlooked 
in these studies. Two recent cross-sectional studies using DHS data found no 
evidence that either income inequality or health expenditures were associated 
with inequalities in neonatal and child mortality (Kruk et al., 2011; McKinnon et 
al., 2016). The cross-sectional nature of these studies, however, means they are 
vulnerable to bias from unobserved confounding between countries, and cannot 
elucidate changes within countries – two challenges this study attempts to 
overcome.   
 
The limited evidence on the relationship between government health 
expenditure and inequalities in IMR may stem from the study designs employed, 
but also may be due to alternative pathways by which government expenditures 
impact on health inequalities. As suggested by researchers of inequalities in high-
income countries, government spending outside of health care may be of critical 
importance to the health of the poorest social groups and therefore may be more 
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important for reducing inequalities (Dahlgren and Whitehead, 2006). This was a 
core message of the WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of Health, and 
has recently re-emerged in LMICs as a key justification for social protection 
policies (Adato and Bassett, 2009; WHO, 2008). Furthermore, government 
expenditure on health may be influenced by many factors that either exacerbate 
or re-enforce existing health inequalities. For example, elite capture, where those 
with higher status influence resource allocation to their own benefit, may exist 
and may be particularly problematic in LMICs where weaker accountability 
mechanisms often operate. This could be envisioned as increased expenditures 
on specialist secondary care, which may be opposed to the health needs of the 
more deprived. Conversely, expenditure on non-health areas may be more 
impervious to elite capture if the actions are universal (e.g. sanitation systems) 
or targeted towards deprived populations (e.g. social protection programmes). 
None-the-less, the extent to which this may be the case rests on wider factors 
including accountability, power structures, and political priorities, and little 
research has been conducted in these areas. To our knowledge, the relative 
association of health and non-health government expenditures on health 
inequalities in LMICs has not been examined. 
 
This study aims to assess the association between government expenditures and 
social inequalities in IMR in a panel of 48 LMICs from 1993-2013. We examine 
how total government expenditure, government expenditure on health and non-
health areas, and government redistribution efforts are associated with IMR 
inequalities.  
 7 
 
<Figure 1 here > 
Methods 
Study design 
This analysis employs fixed-effects panel data regression methods. Panel data 
methods are appropriate for repeated measures over time for each country 
(Wooldridge, 2003). Countries are the unit of analysis. The study was approved 
by the Imperial College Research Ethics Committee (reference 16IC3663). 
 
Data 
The main sources of data for the analysis were Demographic Health Surveys 
(DHS) carried out by The DHS Programme from years 1993 to 20131. DHS are 
internationally standardised surveys based on a nationally representative 
sample of households in LMICs. Respondents provide information on household 
wealth2, alongside complete birth histories and deaths, and use of health services 
by women and children. We obtained country-level data on IMRs for each wealth 
quintile in each country from the WHO’s Global Health Observatory (WHO, 2016). 
The WHO produces this data based on DHS datasets. We included all countries 
that had been surveyed at least twice between 1993 and 2013 to create an 
                                                        
 
1 https://dhsprogram.com/  
2 Detailed information on how the DHS Programme defines and measures their wealth index is 
available at https://dhsprogram.com/topics/wealth-index/. In summary, they state “The wealth 
index is calculated using easy-to-collect data on a household’s ownership of selected assets, such as 
televisions and bicycles; materials used for housing construction; and types of water access and 
sanitation facilities… the wealth index places individual households on a continuous scale of 
relative wealth. DHS then separates all interviewed households into five wealth quintiles.” 
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unbalanced panel of 48 LMICs. Countries had been surveyed between 2 and 7 
times during the period 1993-2013.  
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, government expenditure and its 
division into government sectors (including health, education, and military 
expenditure) were extracted from the World Development Indicators (in 
constant 2011 US Dollars, adjusted for PPP)(World Bank, 2016). Each 
government expenditure variable was then re-calculated as a percentage of GDP 
to account for GDP growth, inflation over time, and population growth. 
Additionally, private health expenditures (as a % of GDP), out of pocket (OOP) 
private health expenditures (as a % of GDP), and the Polity IV index of democracy 
were extracted from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 
2016). As an alternative indicator of the strength of a country’s democracy, we 
also extracted from the Database of Political Institutions data on whether a 
country uses proportional representation in their elections (World Bank, 2015). 
 
We extracted income inequality indicators from the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID). We selected income inequality before government 
redistribution (GINI market), and income inequality after government 
redistribution (GINI net) taking the mean of the SWIID multiple imputation 
results (Solt, 2016). The GINI is a commonly used measure of income inequality, 
and ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality).  
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For sensitivity analysis, we also obtained fertility rates (live births per 
reproductive age women), access to health services (a composite index of access 
to key reproductive, maternal and child health services), and malnutrition (% 
stunting amongst children under 3) for each wealth quintile from the DHS 
datasets (WHO, 2016). Access to water and sanitation services was not available 
by quintile, so mean access to water and sanitation was extracted from the World 
Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2016).  
 
Dependent variables 
The main outcome variables were the Slope Index of Inequality (SII) and the 
Relative Index of Inequality (RII). These were calculated from the quintile specific 
IMRs obtained for each country for each year that the country was surveyed. The 
SII and RII are, respectively, absolute and relative indices of inequality, and they 
have been widely employed in similar studies (e.g. McKinnon et al., 2014a). The 
SII, an absolute measure of inequality, is produced by linearly regressing the IMR 
in each quintile on the rank of the quintiles, and represents the absolute 
difference in IMR between the top and the bottom of the wealth distribution. The 
RII is the SII divided by the mean IMR, and represents the relative difference in 
IMR between the top and bottom of the wealth distribution. These measures are 
superior to simple differences and ratios of the bottom and top quintile’s IMR as 
they are informed by data from all quintiles. We used quintile-based measures of 
inequality rather than concentration indices because quintile-based IMR data is 
publicly available and quality controlled from the WHO’s Global Health 
Observatory, and because these measures are recommended both in the WHO’s 
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inequality handbook and O’Donnell et al (2008) World Bank report on measuring 
inequalities(O’Donnell et al., 2008; World Health Organization, 2013). In 
addition, the RII and the concentration index are closely related and considered 
mathematically equivalent, and so we would therefore expect results for the 
concentration index to be roughly similar to those presented in this paper 
(Wagstaff et al., 1991). Both SIIs and RIIs of IMR are used as dependent variables 
in this study and, whilst both measure inequalities, the results from both are 
presented as they have different normative interpretations, and can, at times, go 
in different directions (Houweling et al., 2007; Wagstaff, 2015).  
 
Independent variables 
Based on our conceptual framework (Figure 1), the main variables of interest 
were government expenditure on health (as a percentage of GDP), non-health 
government expenditure (as a percentage of GDP), and government 
redistribution effort. Non-health government expenditure was calculated by 
subtracting government health expenditure from total government expenditure. 
For a sub-sample of countries with the data available, military and education 
expenditures were then also subtracted to produce government expenditure net 
of health, education, and military expenditure. Government redistribution was 
calculated as the difference between the market GINI coefficient and the net 
(after tax) GINI coefficient to capture the degree to which governments were 
intervening to redistribute income.  
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Covariates were employed when modelling the SII and RII of IMRs to both 
identify associations and control for potential confounders. We included 
potential confounders of the relationship between government expenditure and 
inequalities in IMR based on a review of the literature (Houweling and Kunst, 
2010), theoretical considerations from our conceptual framework, and data 
availability. GDP per capita was included to capture changes in country income, 
and was logged because it was heavily skewed. Private OOP health expenditures 
were subtracted from total private health expenditures to produce non-OOP 
private health expenditures (as a percentage of GDP). Private OOP and private 
non-OOP health expenditure capture the level of pre-pooling within the health 
system, the extent to which individuals are exposed to healthcare costs, and the 
overall role the private system plays in the health system. Both were included in 
the model as they may impart differential impacts on health inequalities (Spaan 
et al., 2012).  
 
A democracy indicator (Polity IV) was included in the model as it may influence 
factors such as elite capture and the degree to which government efforts are 
focused on the poor. It has also been found to be associated with lower infant 
mortality and higher life expectancy in high income countries (Mackenbach et al., 
2013). There is, however, extensive debate regarding the extent to which 
democracy is indeed pro-poor and can reduce health inequalities (Ross, 2006). 
Polity IV is the standard indicator for democracy in political and social science 
research (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). We used the polity2 version of the 
indicator that was produced specifically for time series analysis as part of the 
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Polity IV project3. It varies from -10 (strongly authoritarian) to +10 (strongly 
democratic), based on assessments of the competitiveness and openness of 
political participation and executive recruitment, and constraints on the 
executive. We also used the democracy indicator to create a democracy dummy 
variable and stratify additional analysis. This additional analysis enabled us to 
explore whether the relationship between government expenditure and 
inequalities in IMR varies according to a country’s average level of democracy 
over our study period. In our sample, Polity IV was distinctly bimodal, and so we 
specified countries as lower democracy (if their average Polity IV over time was 
between -10 and +4.9) and higher democracy (Polity IV of 5.0 or above). 5.0 was 
selected as the cut-off because it was the median value in our sample.  As part of 
the sensitivity analysis, we also ran the analysis by stratifying the countries into 
those that use proportional representation in their elections and those that did 
not. 
 
Intermediate variables 
Our conceptual framework assumes that income inequality and government 
expenditures can influence inequalities in IMR at least partly due to changes in 
inequalities in key intermediate variables. We therefore created Slope Indices of 
Inequality for three available indicators from the WHO’s Global Health 
Observatory, which are based on DHS data (WHO, 2016). These were calculated 
from each wealth quintile’s fertility rates, access to health services, and an 
indicator of malnutrition (% stunting amongst children under 3). Access to Water 
                                                        
3 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
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and Sanitation services was not available by quintile, and so instead mean access 
to Water and Sanitation was used.  These intermediate factors above were not 
available for all countries and are also potentially on the pathway between 
government expenditure and inequalities in IMR. Therefore to preserve the 
sample size and to avoid over-controlling they were not included in the base 
model, but added one by one during model sensitivity analysis. 
 
Regression models 
Fixed-effects panel regression was employed as an appropriate method for 
modelling panel data. Longitudinal regression methods were necessary as data 
points of each country over time in a panel are likely to be highly correlated 
(violating the principles of linear regression). Fixed-effects model specifications 
were used to control for any unobserved country characteristics (unobserved 
heterogeneity) that are constant over time and may be associated with observed 
explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2003). This, for example, includes climate, 
natural resources, ethnic diversity, and cultural factors. This avoids omitted 
variable biases from time-invariant factors that can plague cross-sectional 
ecological research (Conley and Springer, 2001). On the other hand, only 
associations from the changes within countries over time are estimated. In other 
words, any associations between countries (i.e. between general levels of 
inequalities in IMR and government expenditures across countries) are not 
estimated. A random-effects specification may have been more efficient, 
however, Hausman tests confirmed that the random-effects assumption was 
violated in our models (Hausman test: p=0.003 for our main SII model, and 
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p=0.028 for the our main RII model).  The use of fixed-effects specifications is also 
particularly advantageous for our research question because data on the 
determinants of inequalities in LMICs is limited, preventing us from fully pre-
specifying a model with all confounders. Whilst there is the potential for omitted 
variable bias from time-variant factors, we control for time trends to reduce the 
risk of confounding by secular trends (such as improving health technologies) 
that previous time series research may have been susceptible to (Sogaard, 1992; 
Wagstaff, 1985). A linear time specification was preferred over year dummies 
because the trends were found to be generally linear, and to preserve degrees of 
freedom in our small dataset. Alternative time specifications were included in 
sensitivity analysis. Because IMR responds rapidly to changing circumstances we 
followed previous authors and did not include lagged specifications of our models 
(Conley and Springer, 2001). Data was analysed in Stata 14.1 (StataCorp, 2015).  
 
Statistical analysis 
Firstly, a descriptive overview of the dataset was produced. For the study period 
(1993-2013), the overall mean, overall standard deviation, and the between-
country and within-country standard deviation of each variable were calculated. 
The mean annual within-country change in each variable was calculated with 
univariate fixed-effects longitudinal regressions between each variable and time 
(as a linear variable). For some countries, certain variables were not available 
and so only a subset of countries was used with the number of countries and 
observations used indicated.  
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Secondly, multivariate fixed-effects longitudinal regression was employed with 
both the SII and RII of IMR for 48 countries as dependent variables. These were 
used to examine the relationship between total government expenditure and 
inequalities in IMR. In addition to total government expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP, models were controlled for GDP per capita (Log), Democracy indicator 
(Polity IV), Private non-OOP health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Private 
OOP health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, country-level fixed-effects, and a 
linear time trend. Sequential addition of covariates was undertaken and 
presented to demonstrate model stability. The model specifications were: 
 
1) IMR_SIIit = Gov_expenditureit + LogGDPit + Democracyit + Private_health_not_OOPit + Private_health_OOPit 
+ Countryi + t + εit 
 
2) IMR_RIIit = Gov_expenditureit + LogGDPit + Democracyit + Private_health_not_OOPit + Private_health_OOPit 
+ Countryi + t+ εit 
 
Where: Xit = the value of variable X in country i for the year t; εit  = is the idiosyncratic error term for country 
i in year t (not estimated). 
 
Thirdly, five multivariate fixed-effects longitudinal regressions with the same 
specifications as above were employed with the IMR of each wealth quintile as 
the dependent variable. This was done to understand better the relationship 
between inequalities in IMR and total government expenditure. The model 
specifications were: 
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3) IMRqit = Gov_expenditureit + LogGDPit + Democracyit + Private_health_not_OOPit + Private_health_OOPit + 
Countryi + t + εit 
 
Where: Xit = the value of variable X in country i for the year t; IMRqit = the IMR for wealth quintile q in country 
i for year t; εit  = is the idiosyncratic error term for country i in year t (not estimated); 
 
Fourthly, to examine whether the relationship between total government 
expenditure was influenced by the democratic nature of a country, stratification 
of the fixed-effects longitudinal regression models 1 and 2 were undertaken. A 
dummy variable for democracy was employed - indicating whether a country had 
high or low average levels of democracy over the study period.   
 
Fifthly, disaggregation of total government expenditure was undertaken to 
further explore the relationship with inequalities in IMR. Total government 
expenditure was disaggregated into: i) health and non-health areas; ii) health, 
education, and non-health/non-education areas; iii) health, education, military, 
and non-health/non-education/non-military areas. The main regression models 
1 and 2 specified above were repeated, using disaggregated government 
expenditures as dependent variables. Due to missing observations in the 
expenditure disaggregation data, a sub-sample of countries was used in some of 
the analysis (number of observations for each analysis are shown in the results 
tables).  
 
Lastly, the effect of government redistribution efforts was explored. The 
regressions on the SII and RII of IMR with total government expenditure (models 
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1 and 2) were repeated, with the introduction of the government redistribution 
efforts variable. Due to missing data, 22.4% of the observations were excluded.  
For comparability, the regression models on total government expenditure 
(without government redistribution efforts) were repeated with this sub-sample 
of observations.  
 
All regression models employed cluster-robust standard errors to take into 
account the clustered nature of the data, and mitigate potential autocorrelation 
and heteroskedascity (Wooldridge, 2010) . 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
We conducted additional analyses to check the sensitivity of our findings. Firstly, 
all regression models were re-run with outliers removed - defined as those with 
absolute studentized residuals of two or more, and without observations with a 
high leverage. Secondly, alternative specifications of the models were explored to 
identify potentially spurious relationships.  The Stata module mrobust was 
employed to see if the results on total government expenditure were sensitive to 
inclusion or exclusion of variables (Young and Holsteen, 2015). Thirdly, the 
regression models were repeated with year dummies rather than a linear time 
trend. Fourthly, multivariate longitudinal models with total government 
expenditure were estimated with the additional intermediate variables included 
as covariates (specifically mean access to water and sanitation, and inequalities 
in fertility, stunting and health service access). Due to missing observations, the 
sample sizes for these models were considerably smaller and thus sequential 
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addition of covariates was undertaken to preserve statistical power. Fifthly, we 
replaced government redistribution with income inequality before government 
redistribution (market GINI), and repeated the democracy stratification analysis, 
this time stratifying the countries into those that use proportional representation 
in their elections and those that did not. Finally, the absolute level of IMR was 
added to the main models to observe if the relationship between government 
expenditure and inequalities in IMR was sensitive to changes in the level of IMR. 
 
Results 
Descriptive results 
Our study included 142 observations from 48 LMICs (an average of 3.0 
observations per country). A list of countries included is in Appendix 1. The 
overall mean, overall standard deviation, between-country standard deviation, 
within-country standard deviation, and average within-country change per year 
for each variable are shown in Table 1. The mean IMR SII over the study period 
was 39.12, illustrating that the average absolute difference in the IMR between 
the richest and poorest quintiles was 39.12 deaths per 1000 live births. The IMR 
SII was falling at 2.022 per year on average, showing the absolute gap between 
the richest and poorest quintiles’ IMR was narrowing over time. The mean IMR 
RII was 0.69 over the study period, meaning the IMR for the poorest quintile was 
on average 69% higher than for the richest quintile. The mean IMR RII was falling 
each year by 0.010 suggesting the relative differences in IMR were falling over 
time. Total government expenditure on average comprised 12.43% of a country’s 
GDP and was increasing each year by 0.086%. 
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<Table 1 here> 
 
Total government expenditure and inequalities in IMR  
The results from the fixed-effects longitudinal regressions of the SII and RII of 
IMR on total government expenditure are shown in Table 2 and 3, including the 
sequential addition of covariates in models 1 to 5. In fully adjusted multivariate 
models, total government expenditure remains consistently and significantly 
associated with lower absolute (SII) and relative (RII) inequalities in the IMR, 
even when controlling for linear time trends, democracy, GDP per capita, and OOP 
and non-OOP private health expenditure. For each percentage increase in total 
government expenditure (as a per cent of GDP), the SII of IMR decreased by -
2.468 (95% CIs: -4.190 to -0.746) and the RII decreased by -0.026 (95% CIs: -
0.048 to -0.004). Apart from the time trends, all other covariates were non-
significant except for democracy, which was significantly associated with 
reductions in RII, but not SII.  
 
<Table 2 and 3 here> 
 
Total government expenditure and quintile-specific IMR  
To understand better the relationship between total government expenditure 
and reductions in inequalities in IMR, associations between IMR in each wealth 
quintile and total government expenditure were explored.  Figure 2 shows the 
point estimates and confidence intervals for the coefficients for total government 
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expenditure from the quintile-specific multivariate regression models on IMR. 
The relationship between total government expenditure and IMR appears to 
follow a social gradient, where the IMR falls the most in the poorest quintile. Full 
multivariate regression results are shown in Appendix 2. For the poorest quintile, 
a one-percentage point increase in total government expenditure was associated 
with a reduction in IMR of -2.020 (95% CIs: -3.835 to -0.187). The relationship 
between IMR and total government expenditure was non-significant in wealth 
quintiles 4 and 5 (the richest) suggesting the reductions in inequalities in IMR 
were driven mainly by reductions in IMR in the poorest quintiles.  
 
<Figure 2 here> 
 
Stratification by level of democracy 
Because Polity IV was strongly bimodal, we divided our sample into two groups, 
using the median of the Polity IV democracy indicator as the cut-off. Respectively 
there were 24 countries in the lower democracy group and 24 countries in the 
higher democracy group. The results from multivariate regression models for 
both the SII and RII of IMR for both groups of countries are shown in Table 4a. 
Whilst there was no significant relationship between total government 
expenditure and inequalities in IMR in countries with lower levels of democracy, 
in countries with higher levels of democracy increased total government 
expenditure was associated with lower absolute inequalities in IMR (SII). During 
sensitivity analysis, very similar results were found when stratifying the 
countries by use of proportional representation (see Table 4b).  
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<Table 4a here> 
<Table 4b here> 
 
Inequalities in IMR and disaggregated government expenditure  
This component of the study examines the relationship between inequalities in 
IMR and disaggregated government expenditure. As noted in the conceptual 
framework, total government expenditure might impact on health inequalities 
through government expenditure on health or government expenditure on non-
health areas, or government redistribution effort. This was explored by repeating 
our regression models with disaggregated government expenditure.  
 
Table 5 shows the results from multivariate regression models with total 
government expenditure (the same model as the first part of the analysis) and 
with total government expenditure divided into expenditure on health and non-
health areas. In disaggregated models (models 2 and 4 in Table 5), there was no 
significant association between government expenditure on health and both the 
SII and RII of IMR, whereas government expenditure on non-health areas was 
significantly associated with reductions in both the SII and RII of IMR. Further 
disaggregation of total government expenditure was undertaken, although due to 
missing data the number of countries available for analysis was lower (Table 6). 
Total government expenditure was disaggregated into expenditure on health, 
education, and all non-health/non-education areas (models 1 and 2 in Table 6), 
and further into expenditure on the military and all non-health/non-
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education/non-military areas (models 3 and 4 in Table 6). In all models, 
government expenditure on health, education, and the military were not 
associated with inequalities in IMR. Government expenditure on non-
health/non-education and also non-health/non-education/non-military areas 
were significantly associated with reductions in the SII of IMR. Respectively, the 
coefficients for these associations were - 5.493 (CI: -10.510 to -0.480) and -5.582 
(CIs -10.230 to -0.931). There were no significant associations between these 
areas of government expenditures and the RII of IMR in these models. It is not 
possible to infer whether reduced sample-size (and statistical power), the nature 
of the sub-sample of countries, or the underlying relationships with government 
expenditure explain either the non-significance of the RII of IMR or the greater 
reductions in the SII found compared to the models earlier in the analysis. This is 
the limit of how much government expenditure can be broken down in our data.  
 
<Table 5 and 6 here > 
 
Association between government redistribution efforts and IMR inequalities 
The regression models including total government expenditure were repeated 
with the addition of a government redistribution effort variable (Table 7, models 
2 and 4). Missing data reduced the number of available observations, so for 
comparability, the main regressions with total government expenditure but 
without redistribution efforts were repeated on the sub-sample (models 1 and 3 
in Table 7). Similar relationships between total government expenditure and the 
reductions in the SII in IMR were observed both with and without government 
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redistribution efforts, and these were also comparable to the results on the whole 
sample of countries. Regarding the RII, there was no significant relationship 
between total government expenditure in either model suggesting the reduced 
number of observations limited statistical power. Government redistribution 
efforts were not significant associated with SII or RII. As a sensitivity analysis, 
when government redistribution effort was replaced with income inequality 
before government redistribution (market GINI), the results remained 
essentially unchanged and market GINI was not significantly associated with SII 
or RII (see Appendix 3). 
 
<Table 7 here> 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
The main results were robust to the removal of outliers, observations with high 
leverage and the use of year dummies rather than linear time trends. Total 
government expenditure also remained significantly and negatively associated 
with inequalities in IMR in all 32 alternative model specifications in Stata module 
mrobust (Young and Holsteen, 2015). 
 
Intermediate factors between the relationship of government expenditure and 
IMR inequalities were sequentially included in the regression model to test 
whether total government expenditure remained significant. Although a sub-
sample of countries was used (due to missing data), the relationship between 
total government expenditure and inequalities in IMR remained significant and 
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with a similar coefficient after controlling for mean Water and Sanitation 
coverage, and inequalities in Fertility, Stunting and Health Service Coverage (see 
Appendix 4 for results). Finally, the addition of the absolute level of IMR to the 
models did not significantly change the results (see Appendix 5). 
 
Discussion 
 
Key findings 
Total government expenditure was consistently associated with lower absolute 
(SII) and relative (RII) inequalities in IMRs, even when controlling for country 
fixed effects, linear time trends, democracy, GDP per capita, OOP and non-OOP 
private health expenditure. For each percentage point that total government 
expenditure increased (as a % of GDP), the SII of IMR decreased by -2.468 (95% 
CIs: -4.190 to -0.746) and the RII of IMR decreased by -0.026 (95% CIs: -0.048 to 
-0.004). This means that for each percentage point increase in government 
spending as a proportion of GDP, the difference in infant mortality rates between 
the richest and poorest quintile fell by 2.468, which is approximately 6.5% of the 
total difference. 
 
Further examination of this relationship identified that it is mainly driven by 
reductions in the IMR in the poorest quintiles and appears to occur mostly in 
countries with higher levels of democracy (and those that use proportional 
representation). Disaggregation of government expenditure revealed that the 
relationship between total government expenditure and reduced inequalities in 
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IMR appears to be driven by expenditure on non-health rather than health areas. 
Furthermore, results from a sub-sample of countries shows that the relationship 
between lower inequalities and total government expenditures persisted when 
removing expenditure on health, education, and the military. No evidence was 
found that GDP per capita, government redistribution, government health 
expenditures or private health expenditures were associated with inequalities in 
IMR. Our results were robust to alternative model specifications and to the 
inclusion of intermediate factors in the models. 
 
We originally hypothesised three factors that could influence inequalities in IMR: 
government health expenditure, government non-health expenditure, and 
government redistribution efforts. This was based on Houweling and Kunst’s 
conceptual framework (2010). Our findings support the hypothesis that 
government non-health expenditure is most strongly associated with reducing 
infant health inequalities.  
 
There are a range of potential mechanisms that could explain our findings. 
However, due to limited data availability, our study was not able to identify 
specific components of non-health government expenditure most strongly 
associated with lower inequalities in IMR. In the 69 observations with data 
available, our sub-analysis suggested that, even when removing health, education 
and military expenditure, government expenditure remains strongly and 
significantly associated with reducing inequalities in IMR. What remains in this 
section of government expenditure is not reported in the World Bank database. 
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It may include government expenditure that expands basic incomes through 
social protection programmes or employment, improves transport and 
infrastructure, or promotes a healthier environment. For example, recent 
evidence has found that social protection expenditures can improve health 
outcomes and reduce health inequalities (Ataguba et al., 2015; Khan et al., 2016; 
Stuckler et al., 2009; WHO, 2008). Further research, focusing on countries with 
more disaggregated government expenditure data, and particularly social 
protection data, is needed to explore this further. 
 
The non-significance of health expenditures (both from the government and 
private sector) was found in all our models. This is consistent with the results of 
two recent cross-sectional ecological studies that also found no evidence that 
health expenditures were associated with inequalities in neonatal and child 
mortality inequalities (Kruk et al., 2011; McKinnon et al., 2016). There are 
multiple pathways through which health expenditure can improve infant 
mortality, but the extent to which distribution of funds and resources in the 
health system are “pro-poor” and reduce health inequalities is politically 
determined and cannot be assumed. Indeed, government health expenditure in 
high income countries is often noted to be pro-rich, as noted by Hart, who 
described it as the inverse care law (Hart, 1971; McLean et al., 2015).  
 
We found that redistribution efforts by governments had no association with 
inequalities in IMR in LMICs. Whilst this result is surprising theoretically, 
empirical studies have often been unable to confirm the link between income 
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inequalities and child health inequality, particularly in LMICs (Houweling and 
Kunst, 2010; Truesdale and Jencks, 2016). Indeed, in one cross-sectional, 
ecological study using DHS data in LMICs, McKinnon et al. (2016) were also 
unable to find an association between income inequality and inequalities in 
neonatal mortality rates. One explanation for this finding might be that the fixed 
effect methodology we employed estimates only within-country associations 
over time. The mean government redistribution value was 4.90 with a standard 
deviation of 2.31, but the mean within-country standard deviation was only 0.41 
suggesting that, as expected, most of the variation in redistribution mechanisms 
is between countries – something that was not estimated in this analysis. Whilst 
we might conclude that changes in within-country redistributive efforts do not 
appear to affect IMR inequalities, we do not know about the effect between 
countries on average. Furthermore, we only looked for associations in changes in 
inequalities in IMR and redistributive efforts at the same point in time, and so, 
compared to government expenditures, there may be a greater period until the 
effects of redistributive efforts are felt. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
Fixed-effects longitudinal regression methods are robust methods for evaluating 
associations over time as time-invariant confounders can be controlled for and 
they permit elucidation of associations whilst controlling for time trends. 
Between-country variation is removed however, and so understanding of 
potential differences between countries in the terms of the explanatory variables 
is lost. This was considered necessary to avoid the assumptions of random-effects 
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specifications. Country-level data points are used in this analysis and so an 
ecological bias may be present. It is therefore not possible to make individual 
inference based on this analysis. Furthermore, the study design does not enable 
causal inference and the relationships identified must be considered as 
associations.  
 
The use of both Slope and Relative Indices of Inequality, which in this study 
generally went in the same direction, enabled us to assess the impact on both 
absolute and relative inequalities. This measure makes use of data from across 
five wealth quintiles, and so is a better summary description of overall inequality. 
Because we generated the SII and RII from quintile-specific IMRs, there is still 
likely to be considerable heterogeneity within each wealth quintile. This study 
was thus unable to assess any associations or factors that changed within each 
quintile. 
 
Data limitations are inevitable when in LMICs, however the DHS do produce 
reliable and high-quality datasets. Standardised methodology enables 
comparison between the 48 countries and over time periods in addition to the 
creation of measures of health inequalities in IMR. Whilst it is important to 
acknowledge limitations may exist in terms of sampling strategy and response 
bias, DHS datasets are very valuable for conducting research in data-limited 
LMICs. There were a limited number of DHS surveys carried out to date that could 
be used in the analysis. This allowed us to include 142 observations, which, 
although sufficient when examining total government expenditure, was 
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problematic for any further sub-analysis. For example, it was not possible to 
examine differences by regions of the world or by country development. Lack of 
data on inequalities in access to water and sanitation also prevented us from 
adequately exploring this promising intermediate variable. Missing data from 
countries on income inequality, and disaggregated government expenditure 
reduced the sample size substantially and compromised statistical power. Our 
wealth index, while widely used in the context of low-and-middle-income 
countries, is not a perfect measure of wealth, and different components of the 
index may be differently valued across countries. Finally, there was limited data 
on further disaggregated government expenditure, and particularly on social 
protection expenditures, which prevented further elucidation of potential 
mechanisms of action. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This is the first study to the authors’ knowledge to examine total government 
expenditure and health inequalities in IMR in LMICs. There appears to be 
relationship between non-health government expenditure, potentially mediated 
through the wider social determinants of health, which needs to be further 
investigated. Further studies are warranted to determine the exact components 
of government expenditure that impart impact and the mechanisms of action. It 
is further necessary to understand the reasons as to why health inequalities seem 
resistant to increases in government health expenditure and mechanisms to 
redistribute income.  
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Theoretical considerations underpin much of the current global agenda for 
improving health and reducing inequalities. This research identifies that one 
widely believed idea, that spending more money on health will improve health 
inequalities, is not necessarily true. Instead, our results suggest that increasing 
other areas of Government expenditure might be more important, and future 
research should aim to disentangle which areas of public policy might be more 
critical to reduce infant mortality among the poor. Expanding the debate within 
the global development arena and with donor agencies, and furthering our 
understanding of the relationships between governments and inequalities is vital 
to prioritise policies and interventions to reduce health inequalities.  
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Table 1: Summary of means, overall standard deviation, between country 
standard deviation, mean within-country standard deviations and mean 
within-country trends for variables 
Variable Overall 
Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Between -
country SD 
Within-country 
SD 
Mean annual within- 
country change 
n  (countries) N 
(Obs) 
IMR SII (Slope Index of 
Inequality) 
39.12 23.67 18.65 15.53 -2.022*** 48 142 
IMR RII (Relative Index of 
Inequality) 
0.69 0.40 0.34 0.19 -0.010** 48 142 
Total government 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
12.43 5.33 5.57 1.43 0.086** 48 142 
Gov health expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
2.31 1.19 1.10 0.49 0.044*** 48 142 
Gov non-health 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
10.12 4.62 4.84 1.36 0.041 48 142 
Gov expenditure minus 
health education & 
military (% GDP) 
4.48 2.76 3.33 0.80 0.003 39 82 
Redistribution (Gini 
market - Gini net) 
4.90 2.31 2.24 0.41 0.015 44 110 
Log GDP per capita (2011 
USD adjusted for PPP) 
7.81 0.81 0.78 0.22 0.031*** 48 142 
Democracy (Polity IV) 3.20 4.88 4.38 2.40 0.200** 48 142 
Private non-OOP health 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
0.68 0.81 0.78 0.35 0.033*** 48 142 
Private OOP health 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
2.31 1.17 1.23 0.39 -0.014 48 142 
Improved water source 
(% of population) 
73.61 15.77 15.23 4.62 0.764*** 48 142 
Improved sanitation 
facilities (% of 
population) 
41.51 26.86 26.20 3.55 0.600*** 48 142 
Fertility Slope Index of 
Inequality 
3.51 1.49 1.39 0.64 -0.001 47 130 
Stunting Slope Index of 
Inequality 
24.10 12.55 11.69 4.57 -0.124 45 129 
Health Services Slope Index 
of Inequality 
30.50 13.67 12.18 6.11 -0.785*** 45 131 
Note: Time trends were estimated with univariate fixed-effects regression of each variable with time. Stars represent trend 
significance: * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001; SD – Standard deviation; SII - IMR – infant mortality rate; SII - Slope index of 
inequality; RII- Relative index of inequality; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross Domestic product. 
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Table 2: Results from fixed-effects longitudinal regressions of the Slope 
Index of Inequality on total government expenditure (for 48 countries 
from 1993-2013)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
IMR SII IMR SII IMR SII IMR SII IMR SII       
Total government expenditure 1 -4.371*** -2.628** -2.549** -2.577** -2.468**  
(-4.58) (-3.04) (-3.02) (-3.11) (-2.88) 
Year  -1.798*** -1.604*** -1.486*** -1.350**  
 (-5.97) (-3.83) (-3.65) (-3.01) 
GDP per capita (Log) 2    -6.413 -7.361 -7.881  
  (-0.74) (-0.84) (-0.84) 
Democracy (Polity IV)    -0.430 -0.519  
   (-0.90) (-1.05) 
Private non-OOP health expenditure 1     -3.698  
    (-0.76) 
Private OOP health expenditure 1     -0.698  
    (-0.18) 
Constant 93.43*** 3674.5*** 3335.6*** 3107.8*** 2843.5**  
(7.87) (6.13) (4.22) (4.06) (3.36) 
N (Observations) 142 142 142 142 142 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); IMR – 
infant mortality rate; SII - Slope index of inequality; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross Domestic product. 
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Table 3: Results from fixed-effects longitudinal regressions of the Relative 
Index of Inequality on total government expenditure (for 48 countries 
from 1993-2013) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
IMR RII IMR RII IMR RII IMR RII IMR RII       
Total government expenditure 1 -0.033** -0.026* -0.025* -0.026* -0.026*  
(-3.19) (-2.38) (-2.37) (-2.50) (-2.36) 
Year 
 
-0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002   
(-2.00) (-1.14) (-0.55) (-0.45) 
 GDP per capita (Log) 2 
  
-0.054 -0.079 -0.088    
(-0.50) (-0.76) (-0.82) 
Democracy (Polity IV) 
   
-0.012* -0.012*     
(-2.02) (-2.03) 
Private non-OOP health expenditure 1 
    
-0.009      
(-0.16) 
Private OOP health expenditure 1 
    
-0.031      
(-0.61) 
Constant 1.098*** 15.860* 13.030 6.935 6.636  
(8.54) (2.15) (1.36) (0.78) (0.65) 
Observations 142 142 142 142 142 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); IMR – 
infant mortality rate; RII- Relative index of inequality; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross Domestic product. 
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Table 4a: Results from fixed-effects longitudinal regressions of the Slope 
and Relative Index of Inequality of IMR on total government expenditure 
for 24 less democratic and 24 more democratic countries (1993-2013) 
 
 
Less Democratic  
Countries  
(Lower Polity IV) 
More Democratic 
Countries  
(Higher Polity IV)  
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
IMR SII IMR RII IMR SII IMR RII 
Total government expenditure 1 -1.851 -0.0259 -3.102** -0.0247  
(-1.14) (-1.30) (-3.60) (-1.93) 
Year -1.302 -0.00624 -1.666** -0.00693  
(-1.70) (-0.60) (-3.34) (-1.15) 
Log GDP per capita 2 -9.889 0.0200 -6.554 -0.178  
(-0.73) (0.12) (-0.53) (-1.19) 
Private non-OOP health expenditure 1 5.775 0.116 -6.349 -0.0309  
(0.60) (0.86) (-1.47) (-0.69) 
Private OOP health expenditure 1 -2.525 -0.0608 -1.094 -0.0338  
(-0.40) (-0.75) (-0.34) (-0.59) 
Constant 2748.1 13.32 3479.4** 16.50  
(1.89) (0.68) (3.75) (1.46) 
Observations 70 70 72 72 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses,  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); IMR – 
infant mortality rate; SII - Slope index of inequality; RII- Relative index of inequality; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross 
Domestic product. 
 
 38 
Table 4b: Results from fixed-effects longitudinal regressions of the Slope 
and Relative Index of Inequality of IMR on total government expenditure 
for 24 countries without proportional representation and 26 countries 
with proportional representation (1993-2013) 
  
Non-Proportional Representation 
countries 
Proportional Representation 
countries  
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
IMR SII IMR RII IMR SII IMR RII 
Total government expenditure 1 -1.062 -0.0116 -3.338** -0.0269  
(-0.72) (-0.63) (-3.14) (-1.69) 
Year -1.374 -0.00980 -1.929*** -0.00973  
(-1.71) (-0.96) (-3.94) (-1.72) 
Log GDP per capita 2 -13.73 -0.0344 -2.799 -0.122  
(-0.91) (-0.19) (-0.25) (-0.89) 
Private non-OOP health expenditure 1 -6.206 -0.0534 0.164 0.0958  
(-0.89) (-0.60) (0.03) (1.14) 
Private OOP health expenditure 1 1.484 0.0239 -3.913 -0.0695  
(0.20) (0.34) (-1.01) (-0.97) 
Constant 2910.2 20.54 3981.2*** 21.74  
(1.90) (1.05) (4.31) (2.01) 
Observations 61 61 73 73 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses,  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); IMR – 
infant mortality rate; SII - Slope index of inequality; RII- Relative index of inequality; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross 
Domestic product. 
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Table 5 – Results from fixed-effects longitudinal regressions of the Slope 
and Relative Index of Inequality of IMR on total and disaggregated 
government expenditure (for 48 countries from 1993-2013)  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
IMR SII IMR SII IMR RII IMR RII 
Total government expenditure 1 -2.468** 
 
-0.0257* 
 
 
(-2.88) 
 
(-2.36) 
 
Gov non-health expenditure 1 
 
-3.030*** 
 
-0.0311**   
(-3.58) 
 
(-2.98) 
Gov health expenditure 1 
 
4.084 
 
0.0378   
(1.18) 
 
(0.88) 
Year -1.350** -1.641** -0.00241 -0.00522  
(-3.01) (-3.42) (-0.45) (-0.88) 
Log GDP per capita 2 -7.881 -7.717 -0.0877 -0.0861  
(-0.84) (-0.87) (-0.82) (-0.84) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.519 -0.580 -0.0120* -0.0126*  
(-1.05) (-1.17) (-2.03) (-2.06) 
Private non-OOP health expenditure 1 -3.698 -2.464 -0.00932 0.00264  
(-0.76) (-0.51) (-0.16) (0.05) 
Private OOP health expenditure 1 -0.698 -0.0504 -0.0307 -0.0244  
(-0.18) (-0.01) (-0.61) (-0.50) 
Constant 2843.5** 3412.7*** 6.636 12.15  
(3.36) (3.76) (0.65) (1.07) 
Observations 142 142 142 142 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); IMR – 
infant mortality rate; SII - Slope index of inequality; RII- Relative index of inequality; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross 
Domestic product. 
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Table 6: Results from fixed-effects longitudinal regressions of the Slope and 
Relative Index of Inequality of IMR on non-health/non-education 
government expenditure and on government expenditure net of health, 
education, & military (in 26 countries from 1993-2013) 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
IMR SII IMR RII  IMR SII IMR RII 
Gov non-health non-education expenditure 1 -5.493* -0.0594  
  
 
(-2.26) (-1.83)  
  
Gov expenditure net of health, education, & military 1    -5.582* -0.0594 
    (-2.47) (-1.81) 
Gov education expenditure 1 3.086 0.0186  3.597 0.0185  
(0.80) (0.42)  (1.04) (0.41) 
Gov health expenditure 1 -2.224 -0.0483  -2.374 -0.0483  
(-0.51) (-0.81)  (-0.53) (-0.81) 
Military expenditure 1 
  
 4.852 -0.0617  
   (0.91) (-0.60) 
Year -2.192* -0.00697  -2.218** -0.00696  
(-2.62) (-0.71)  (-3.31) (-0.70) 
Log GDP per capita 2 0.132 -0.0874  5.827 -0.0886  
(0.01) (-0.45)  (0.45) (-0.41) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.145 -0.00373  0.136 -0.00379  
(-0.25) (-0.46)  (0.22) (-0.44) 
Private non-OOP health expenditure 1 -1.889 -0.0135  -1.398 -0.0136  
(-0.33) (-0.20)  (-0.26) (-0.20) 
Private OOP health expenditure 1 0.936 0.0348  2.670 0.0344  
(0.20) (0.64)  (0.57) (0.53) 
Constant 4461.0** 15.82  4442.5** 15.82  
(2.83) (0.86)  (3.51) (0.85) 
Observations 69 69  69 69 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); IMR – 
infant mortality rate; SII - Slope index of inequality; RII- Relative index of inequality; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross 
Domestic product. 
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Table 7: Results from fixed-effects longitudinal regressions of the Slope and 
Relative Index of Inequality of IMR on total government expenditure and   
government redistribution efforts (36 countries from 1993-2013) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
IMR SII IMR SII IMR RII IMR RII 
Total government expenditure 1 -2.561* -2.620* -0.0248 -0.0257  
(-2.44) (-2.47) (-1.60) (-1.59) 
Year -1.588** -1.623** -0.00610 -0.00660 
 (-2.75) (-2.84) (-0.94) (-1.06) 
Log GDP per capita 2 -8.339 -7.939 -0.165 -0.159 
 (-0.71) (-0.67) (-1.23) (-1.17) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.477 -0.422 -0.00841 -0.00762 
 (-1.06) (-0.90) (-1.14) (-0.95) 
Private non-OOP health expenditure 1 6.277 5.891 0.0824 0.0769 
 (1.20) (1.04) (1.11) (0.93) 
Private OOP health expenditure 1 -1.562 -2.088 -0.0186 -0.0261 
 (-0.38) (-0.47) (-0.40) (-0.48) 
Government redistribution efforts 3 
 
1.474 
 
0.0211   
(0.35) 
 
(0.25) 
Constant 3319.0** 3379.9** 14.60 15.47  
(3.05) (3.15) (1.20) (1.33) 
Observations 102 102 102 102 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); 3 (Gini 
market minus Gini net); IMR – infant mortality rate; SII - Slope index of inequality; RII- Relative index of inequality; OOP 
– Out of pocket; GDP –Gross Domestic product. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework, based on (Houweling and Kunst, 2010; 
Mosley and Chen, 1984) 
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Figure 2: Regression coefficients of total government expenditure from 
multivariate longitudinal regressions of quintile-specific IMR on total 
government expenditure for each wealth quintile (for 48 countries from 
1993-2013) 
 
Notes: The reported coefficients were obtained from multivariate fixed-effects longitudinal regressions of the quintile-
specific IMR on total government expenditure for each wealth quintiles. In addition to total government expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP (coefficients shown in figure), models were controlled for GDP per capita (Log), Democracy, Private 
non-OOP health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Private OOP health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, country-
level fixed-effects, and a linear time trend. Figure shows point estimates and 95% confidence intervals. 
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Appendix 1: 48 Countries included in main panels 
 
Armenia 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 
Burkina Faso 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Chad 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Dominican Republic 
Egypt 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Haiti 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Republic of Tanzania 
Viet Nam 
Zimbabwe 
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Appendix 2: Detailed results from fixed-effects longitudinal regressions of 
each wealth quintile’s IMR on total health expenditure for 48 countries 
(1993-2013) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
WQ1 IMR WQ2 IMR  WQ3 IMR  WQ4 IMR  WQ5 IMR  
Total government expenditure1 -2.020* -1.482* -1.431* -0.606 0.00188 
 
(-2.22) (-2.17) (-2.43) (-0.67) (0.00) 
Year -2.473*** -2.788*** -2.329*** -2.304*** -1.376*** 
 
(-5.70) (-7.03) (-6.89) (-5.98) (-5.74) 
Log GDP per capita 2 -2.162 2.485 1.008 5.107 4.469 
 
(-0.29) (0.34) (0.19) (0.95) (1.13) 
Democracy (Polity IV) 0.327 0.617 0.773 0.598 0.864* 
 
(0.59) (1.12) (1.33) (1.09) (2.28) 
Private non-OOP health expenditure1 -6.472 -2.544 -2.642 -4.151 -1.827 
 
(-1.25) (-0.52) (-0.61) (-0.79) (-0.70) 
Private OOP health expenditure 1 0.160 -0.248 -0.108 2.572 -0.543 
 
(0.05) (-0.08) (-0.04) (0.94) (-0.32) 
Constant 5078.5*** 5658.3*** 4744.2*** 4640.1*** 2767.9*** 
 
(6.13) (7.50) (7.37) (6.25) (6.05) 
Observations 142 142 142 141 141 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); IMR – 
infant mortality rate; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross Domestic product. 
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Appendix 3 – addition of market GINI 
 
Table A3 Government redistribution models (1) and (3), with market Gini 
added in in (2) and (4)  
  
  With 
Gini_market 
 With 
Gini_market  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
IMR SII IMR SII IMR RII IMR RII 
Total government expenditure (% of GDP) -2.561* -2.607* -0.0248 -0.0284 
 (-2.44) (-2.60) (-1.60) (-1.79) 
Year -1.588** -1.627** -0.00610 -0.00570 
 (-2.75) (-2.87) (-0.94) (-0.91) 
Log GDP per capita (2011 USD adjusted for PPP) -8.339 -8.001 -0.165 -0.146 
 (-0.71) (-0.67) (-1.23) (-1.10) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.477 -0.429 -0.00841 -0.00600 
 (-1.06) (-0.94) (-1.14) (-0.75) 
Private non-OOP health expenditure (% of GDP) 6.277 5.915 0.0824 0.0718 
 (1.20) (1.05) (1.11) (0.86) 
Private OOP health expenditure (% of GDP) -1.562 -2.106 -0.0186 -0.0222 
 (-0.38) (-0.48) (-0.40) (-0.38) 
gini_market  -0.0530  0.0113 
  (-0.07)  (0.84) 
Gov Redistribution (Gini market - Gini net)  1.629  -0.0120 
  (0.31)  (-0.11) 
Constant 3319.0** 3390.5** 14.60 13.21 
 (3.05) (3.20) (1.20) (1.12) 
Observations 102 102 102 102 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); IMR – 
infant mortality rate; SII - Slope index of inequality; RII- Relative index of inequality; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross 
Domestic product. 
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Appendix 4: Additional analysis of intermediate variables 
 
Tables A4.1: Adding Water and Sanitation covariates to main model for 48 
countries between 1993-2013 (models 1 and 3 show main SII and RII models, 2 and 
4 include additional covariates) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
IMR SII IMR SII IMR RII IMR RII 
Total government expenditure 1 -2.468** -2.472** -0.0257* -0.0253* 
 
(-2.88) (-2.78) (-2.36) (-2.34) 
Year -1.350** -1.894** -0.00241 -0.0172 
 
(-3.01) (-2.76) (-0.45) (-2.00) 
Log GDP per capita 2 -7.881 -7.363 -0.0877 -0.0784 
 
(-0.84) (-0.80) (-0.82) (-0.77) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.519 -0.479 -0.0120* -0.0114 
 
(-1.05) (-0.93) (-2.03) (-1.99) 
Private non-OOP health expenditure 1 -3.698 -4.641 -0.00932 -0.0305 
 
(-0.76) (-1.05) (-0.16) (-0.66) 
Private OOP health expenditure 1 -0.698 -0.926 -0.0307 -0.0399 
 
(-0.18) (-0.23) (-0.61) (-0.78) 
Improved water source (% of population) 
 
0.408 
 
0.00856 
  
(0.81) 
 
(1.39) 
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population) 
 
0.393 
 
0.0140 
  
(0.63) 
 
(1.86) 
Constant 2843.5** 3883.8** 6.636 35.05* 
 
(3.36) (2.98) (0.65) (2.14) 
Observations 142 142 142 142 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); IMR – 
infant mortality rate; SII - Slope index of inequality; RII- Relative index of inequality; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross 
Domestic product. 
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Table A4.2: Adding Slope Index of Inequality covariates for fertility, stunting and 
health services to main SII model. Models 1, 3 and 5 show main SII model, 2, 4 
and 6 include additional covariates. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
IMR SII IMR SII IMR SII IMR SII IMR SII IMR SII 
Total government expenditure 1 -2.423* -2.804** -2.530** -2.478** -2.206* -1.848* 
 
(-2.61) (-2.82) (-2.75) (-2.70) (-2.53) (-2.08) 
Year -1.517** -1.377** -1.339** -1.254* -1.598** -1.178* 
 
(-3.09) (-2.70) (-2.76) (-2.61) (-3.45) (-2.15) 
Log GDP per capita 2 -6.647 -5.925 -9.971 -10.25 -4.733 -5.416 
 
(-0.69) (-0.60) (-1.02) (-1.07) (-0.48) (-0.51) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.437 -0.545 -0.961 -1.004 -0.487 -0.368 
 
(-0.70) (-0.91) (-1.60) (-1.69) (-0.97) (-0.73) 
Private non-OOP health 
expenditure 1 -3.535 -6.300 -3.520 -4.226 -3.863 -4.827 
 
(-0.69) (-1.29) (-0.72) (-0.90) (-0.78) (-1.10) 
Private OOP health expenditure 1 -0.00779 -0.929 -0.975 -0.495 -0.674 -0.744 
 
(-0.00) (-0.25) (-0.22) (-0.11) (-0.15) (-0.19) 
Fertility Slope Index of Inequality 
 
4.409 
     
 
(1.43) 
    
Stunting Slope Index of Inequality 
 
 
0.335 
     
 
(1.04) 
  
Health Services Slope Index of 
Inequality 
   
 
0.536 
     
 
(1.30) 
Constant 3166.3** 2874.2** 2839.7** 2661.9** 3312.1*** 2456.3* 
 
(3.39) (2.96) (3.09) (2.93) (3.79) (2.31) 
Observations 128 128 128 128 131 131 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); IMR – 
infant mortality rate; SII - Slope index of inequality; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross Domestic product. 
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Table A4.3: Adding Slope Index of Inequality covariates for fertility, stunting and 
health services to main RII model. Models 1, 3 and 5 show main RII model, 2, 4 
and 6 include additional covariates. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
IMR RII IMR RII IMR RII IMR RII IMR RII IMR RII 
Total government expenditure 1 -0.0256* -0.0298* -0.0245* -0.0236 -0.0207 -0.0175 
 
(-2.22) (-2.43) (-2.12) (-1.99) (-1.95) (-1.67) 
Year -0.00540 -0.00389 -0.00277 -0.00129 -0.00676 -0.00298 
 
(-0.97) (-0.66) (-0.48) (-0.23) (-1.29) (-0.42) 
Log GDP per capita 2 -0.0488 -0.0410 -0.121 -0.125 -0.0153 -0.0215 
 
(-0.44) (-0.38) (-1.09) (-1.17) (-0.14) (-0.19) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.0114 -0.0125 -0.0158* -0.0166* -0.0101 -0.00904 
 
(-1.53) (-1.64) (-2.07) (-2.31) (-1.66) (-1.35) 
Private non-OOP health expenditure 1 -0.0167 -0.0465 -0.00349 -0.0157 -0.0138 -0.0225 
 
(-0.29) (-0.81) (-0.06) (-0.28) (-0.24) (-0.40) 
Private OOP health expenditure 1 -0.0249 -0.0348 -0.0396 -0.0313 -0.0473 -0.0479 
 
(-0.42) (-0.64) (-0.71) (-0.58) (-0.86) (-0.92) 
Fertility Slope Index of Inequality 
 
0.0475 
     
 
(1.31) 
    
Stunting Slope Index of Inequality 
   
0.00582 
   
   
(1.01) 
  
Health Services Slope Index of Inequality 
     
0.00484 
 
     
(0.92) 
Constant 12.30 9.152 7.598 4.513 14.77 7.052 
 
(1.16) (0.81) (0.69) (0.43) (1.49) (0.51) 
Observations 128 128 128 128 131 131 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); IMR – 
infant mortality rate; RII- Relative index of inequality; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross Domestic product. 
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Appendix 5 – Addition of IMR to main models 
 
Table A4.1: Main regressions (1) and (3), with the addition of IMR 
covariates in (2) and (4).  
   
With IMR 
 
With IMR 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
IMR SII IMR SII IMR RII IMR RII 
Total government expenditure (% of GDP) -2.468** -1.975* -0.0257* -0.0262* 
 
(-2.88) (-2.39) (-2.36) (-2.33) 
Year -1.350** -0.349 -0.00241 -0.00342 
 
(-3.01) (-0.83) (-0.45) (-0.46) 
Log GDP per capita (2011 USD adjusted for PPP) -7.881 -8.874 -0.0877 -0.0867 
 
(-0.84) (-1.07) (-0.82) (-0.81) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.519 -0.804 -0.0120* -0.0117 
 
(-1.05) (-1.75) (-2.03) (-1.91) 
Private non-OOP health expenditure (% of GDP) -3.698 -2.211 -0.00932 -0.0108 
 
(-0.76) (-0.48) (-0.16) (-0.19) 
Private OOP health expenditure (% of GDP) -0.698 -0.864 -0.0307 -0.0305 
 
(-0.18) (-0.24) (-0.61) (-0.60) 
Infant Mortality Rate 
 
0.442** 
 
-0.000446 
  
(3.23) 
 
(-0.21) 
Constant 2843.5** 810.4 6.636 8.689 
 
(3.36) (1.00) (0.65) (0.60) 
Observations 142 142 142 142 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001. 1 (% of GDP); 2 (2011 USD adjusted for PPP); IMR – 
infant mortality rate; RII- Relative index of inequality; OOP – Out of pocket; GDP –Gross Domestic product. 
 
 
 
